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I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING STANDLEY SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEGROOT'S AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST STANDLEY

A.

DeGroot is a Third-Party Beneficiary
1. An issue of fact exists as to whether DeGroot is a third party beneficiary of the contract
between Standley and Beltman
As noted in the Appellants' Brief, Idaho Code § 29-102 expressly provides that a contract

made for the express benefit of a third person, may be enforced by that third person. The basic
test for determining a party's status as a third party beneficiary is whether the agreement reflects
an intent to directly benefit a third party. I If the written contract is ambiguous, intent may be
gleaned from circumstances surrounding formation. 2
In this case, the written bid expressly identifies the "DeGroot Dairy.,,3 On the first page,
after the word 'bid,' it states "Stan Beltman" and "DeGroot Dairy.,,4 This fact alone raises an
issue of material fact as to the intent of the parties.
In its Respondent's Brief, Standley argues that the only reference to "DeGroot" on the
bid itself is on the first page of the bid "as a reference to the project name.,,5 First, there is no
indication from the bid itself that DeGroot Dairy refers to a 'project name' rather than a party.
That is merely Standley's interpretation of the bid. DeGroot's position is that the bid refers to
DeGroot as a party, not as a 'project name.' Further, the argument that because DeGroot is only
Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744,874 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part,
125 Idaho 409,871, P.2d 826 (1994).
2 Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462,464,583 P.2d 997 (1978).
3 R. Vol. IV, p. 604.
4 I d.
5 Respondent's Brief, p. 11.
I
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mentioned once demonstrates DeGroot is not a beneficiary holds no water because Stan Beltman
is only mentioned once as well. Standley also tries to draw a distinction between the use of the
term "DeGroot Dairy" rather than Charles DeGroot, Ernest DeGroot or DeGroot Farms, LLC. 6
Again, an examination of the bid notes that only "Stan Beltman" and not Beltman Construction,
Inc. is mentioned. 7 It is signed by Kurt Standley without mention of Standley Trenching, Inc. s
Clearly, the handwritten bid is informal and does not use the legal designation of any party to the
contract. Thus, even the informal designation of "DeGroot Dairy" raises issues of fact as to the
intent of the parties.
At the very least, the informal handwritten bid that identifies both DeGroot and Beltman
is ambiguous. As such, the surrounding circumstances of the bid must be examined to determine
the intent of the parties. 9 An examination of these circumstances leads to the inescapable
conclusion that issues of material fact exist which prevents the entry of summary judgment.
As noted in the Appellants' Brief, Standley became a dealer of Houle equipment in
1998. 10 Standley attended the Tolero Agricultural Show in California in February 1999. 11 At that
show, Kurt Standley was introduced to Charles DeGroot who informed Standley of his intention
to construct a dairy in Nampa, Idaho. 12 After that meeting, Standley bid for the installation of the
manure handling system. 13 Standley specifically designed the manure handling system for

6 !d.
7

R. Vol. IV, p. 604.

8

I d.

Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 464,583 P.2d 997 (1978).
R. Vol. IV, p. 671.
II !d., p.674.
12Id.
13 Id., pp. 604-07.

9

10
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DeGroot by selecting the motor, the motor specifications including horsepower and voltage, the
four-inch pump, pipe size, valves, as well as specifications for the flush system. 14 At the time the
contract was entered into, Standley knew that DeGroot would be paying for the construction of
the dairy, including installation of the manure handling system. IS Thus, installation of the manure
handling system would inure to the benefit of DeGroot upon completion.
The fact that DeGroot was also named as a customer on Standley'S invoices and Houle's
packing slips further evidence the intent of the parties. 16 Additionally, the equipment came with a
warranty registration form. 17 Kurt Standley testified there was a warranty that he would have
honored on the equipment at the DeGroot Dairy.18 In fact, warranty work was performed on the
dairy that DeGroot was not charged for, however, Standley did not keep specific records tracking
that work. 19 These repeated references indicate the parties intended to directly benefit DeGroot
with the design and installation of the custom manure handling system.
The repeated reference to DeGroot in these documents as well as the marketing, custom
design and installation of the dairy components raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
DeGroot's status as a third-party beneficiary of the Standley/BeItman contract.

Id., pp. 674-76.
Id., pp. 674; p.703; p. 704; p. 706; p. 707; p. 709; p. 710; p. 712; p. 7l3; p. 714; p. 717; p. 718; p. 720; p. 721; p.
722; p. 723; p. 724.
16 [d., p.703; p. 704; p. 706; p. 707; p. 709; p. 710; p. 712; p. 713; p. 714; p. 717; p. 718; p. 720; p. 721; p. 722; p.
723; p. 724.
17 R. Vol. IV,p. 569.
18 R. Vol. II, p. 266.
19 d.
I
14

15
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2. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co?O is distinguishable from the instant case

With this factual backdrop in mind, it becomes clear that Standley's reliance on Nelson is
misplaced because this case is factually distinguishable. In Nelson, all of the contracts were oral
with no identification of plaintiff Nelson as a beneficiary?! Here, not only was DeGroot
identified in the initial bid (in the same manner and same number of times as Beltman), but
DeGroot was also identified numerous times in packing slips and customer invoices.
Additionally, DeGroot was provided warranty cards that Standley was willing to honor. Finally,
the manure handling system was marketed to DeGroot directly, it was designed and customized
for DeGroot, and it was installed on the DeGroot Dairy.
B. Standley Breached Express and Implied Warranties

1. DeGroot may seek damages for Standley's breach of express warranties
As stated in the Appellants' Brief, there is ample evidence showing that Standley did, in
fact, make certain affirmations of fact that amount to express warranties. For example, Ernest
DeGroot testified in his deposition that he recalled Jeff Griggs, a Standley employee, telling him
(with respect to whether DeGroot should be performing any maintenance on the manure
handling system), "You won't have to worry about it.,,22 Moreover, Standley spoke with Charles
DeGroot in February 1999 about Houle equipment and about installing such equipment in
DeGroot's dairy. Indeed, Standley held itself out as having specific expertise in Houle's manure

20
21

22

140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (et. App. 2004).
[d., p. 708 (recognizing that "there is no written contract between any of the parties.")
R. Vol. II, p. 238.
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handling equipment, which is why DeGroot ultimately decided to have Standley involved in the
project. Given these factors, it is clear that Standley did provide express warranties to DeGroot.
In response, Standley argues that in "the context of personal injury damages, 'UCC
warranties apply only to those in privity of contract with the manufacturer and those who qualify
as third party beneficiaries ... ",23 Obviously, this case does not involve any claim for personal
injuries. Furthermore, DeGroot is seeking to claim damages for breach of warranties as a third
party beneficiary to the contract between Standley and Beltman. Standley further argues that it
would "make little commercial sense to permit a cause of action by a buyer against a seller for an
express warranty in the absence of a contract.,,24 In cases of a third party beneficiary, however, it
does make sense to allow a beneficiary of a contract to enforce warranties and express
representations by the seller of a product. In fact, it would make no sense to give sellers a blank
check to provide whatever warranty or statement regarding their product to a buyer without
allowing a buyer to rely on such statements.

2. DeGroot may seek damages for Standley'S breach of implied warranties
Idaho Code § 28-2-314(1) provides that "unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind." To be merchantable, the goods must be at least such as (1) pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description; (2) are fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used; and (3) conform to the promises or affirmations made on the
container or label, if any. Idaho Code § 28-2-314(2). DeGroot has alleged facts that, when
23
24

Respondent's Brief, p. 14.
I d.
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viewed in a light most favorable to DeGroot, raise genuine issues of material fact as to the
quality of the manure handling system designed, sold, and installed by Standley.
In response, Standley again states that DeGroot has no claim for breach of implied
warranties because there is no privity of contract between it and DeGroot. 25 As argued above,
however, DeGroot is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Standley and Beltman. As
such, DeGroot is entitled to seek damages against Standley for its breach of implied warranties.
In addition, the status on Idaho law regarding the requirement of privity in this context is
less than clear. Specifically, the holding of Salmon River Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna

Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) has been questioned by this Court on at least
two occasions?6 Based on the arguments expressed in these cases, Salmon River should be
expressly overruled to the extent it requires privity to assert a breach of warranty claim.
Therefore, the district court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on this issue.

C.

DeGroot is Entitled to Seek Damages for Standley's Breach of the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The only argument expressed by Standley in response to DeGroot's claim for breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is that because there was no privity of
contract, Standley cannot be held liable for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing?7 This argument ignores the underlying principles of the duty to act in good faith.

Id., pp. 15-16.
State v. Mitchell Construction Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37,51,740 P.2d 1022 (1987).
27 Respondent's Brief, p. 18.
25

26
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It is well settled that every contract imposes on all parties to the contract an obligation

of good faith and fair dealing in its performance or enforcement. 28 "Goodfaith" means honesty in
fact in the conduct or the transaction concerned. 29 Each party owes a duty to
exercise good faith in its dealings and transactions with the other party.30 If a party fails to deal
honestly with the other party, it is liable for a breach of the duty of good faith?l
As argued above, DeGroot is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Standley
and Beltman. As such, Standley had a duty to act fairly and in good faith toward DeGroot.
Standley's argument to the contrary is inconsistent with the well settled law that "the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be inconsistent with the agreement exercised by
the parties.,,32 Because DeGroot was a third party beneficiary, the intent of the parties was to
benefit DeGroot in the same manner as they would if DeGroot was a party to the contract. To not
treat DeGroot as a party for purposes of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be
inconsistent with the agreement of the parties. As such, DeGroot is entitled to seek damages for
Standley's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

D.

DeGroot is Entitled to Seek Damages for Violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act
DeGroot has raised Issues of material fact regarding the expertise and knowledge

possessed by Standley as a dealer and marketer of Houle equipment, thereby giving rise to
claims pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991).
Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
28

29
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Standley again argues because of a lack of contractual privity between Standley and
DeGroot, such an action cannot be maintained. 33 Again, because DeGroot was a third party
beneficiary of the contract, DeGroot can maintain this cause of action. As such, the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on this issue.

E.

DeGroot is Entitled to Seek Rescission
Standley again argues that the lack of contractual privity prevents DeGroot from

maintaining an action for rescission. 34 As stated in the Appellants' Brief, pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 28-2-608 a buyer may revoke acceptance of goods if the non-conformity of the goods
substantially impairs their value, and if the buyer has accepted the goods on the reasonable
assumption that the non-conformity would be cured and it has not seasonably been cured. 35
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a "buyer" is one who "buys or contracts to buy goods;" a
"seller" is one who "sells or contracts to sell goods.,,36 Acceptance can only be revoked within a
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for the
revocation. 37 A buyer rejects non-conforming goods by taking affirmative action to avoid
acceptance and by notifying the seller of the rejection within a reasonable time. 38

33

Respondent's Brief, p. 19.

34

Id., 20-21.

Idaho
Idaho
37 Idaho
38 Idaho
35

36

Code
Code
Code
Code

§ 28-2-608(l)(a); Beal v. Griffin, 123 Idaho 445,449,849 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1993).
§ 28-2-103(a), (d) (emphasis added).
§ 28-2-608(2).
§ 28-2-602.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 8

In the Respondent's Brief, Standley argues that the statute of frauds prevents DeGroot
from claiming rescission. 39 This argument ignores DeGroots status as third party beneficiary, the
numerous writings via the bid, customer invoices, and packing slips, as well as the performance
that was rendered in designing, customizing, and installing the manure handling system. In short,
DeGroot is entitled to seek rescission against Standley.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DEGROOT'S AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS
AS AN ASSIGNEE OF BELTMAN

A.

Issues of Material Fact Exist as to Degroot's Damages
On March 4, 2005, DeGroot filed its Complaint against Beltman which was consolidated

with the case against Standley and Houle. 4o Beltman filed a Third Party Complaint against
Standley and Houle. 41 Thereafter, DeGroot settled the litigation with Beltman and took an
assignment of the claims against Standley.42 In connection with the settlement, Beltman
stipulated to a judgment in the amount of $964,255.36 DeGroot then filed a satisfaction of
Judgment with district court. 43
Standley repeatedly argues that the claims that were assigned from Beltman to DeGroot
were properly dismissed on summary judgment because 1) Beltman did not pay a monetary
amount to DeGroot, 2) the judgment was satisfied when the Satisfaction of Judgment was filed

Respondent's Brief, p. 21.
Supp. R., pp. 43-52; 53-55; 67-71.
41 Id., p. 56-66.
42 R. Vol. 5, p. 796; R. Vol. 3, pp. 525-26.
43Id.
39

40
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with the district court, and 3) BeItman did not suffer damages separate from the damages
DeGroot claims. 44
Despite Standley's argument to the contrary, DeGroot (through its assigned claims from
BeItman) is not asserting it is entitled to damages in excess of DeGroot's damages. The damages
sought, including damages relating to repair costs, system improvement costs and future repair
costs, derive directly from DeGroot's claims and damages against BeItman. These damages were
incurred regardless of whether BeItman paid 'monetary damages' or a satisfaction of judgment
was filed.
These damages were articulated specifically through the expert reports submitted by
Burke and Hooper. 45 Therefore, genuine issues of material fact exist on the issue of damages and
the trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment.
Further, Standley argues that summary judgment was appropriate because damages were
never liquidated. This argument puts the cart before the horse. The damages were never
liquidated because the district court's decision granting Standley summary judgment deprived
DeGroot of a trial and a chance to have the amount of damages liquidated. Standley also argues
there was never "any determination of apportionment of fauIt between BeItman and Standley on
BeItman's claims and causes of action. ,,46 DeGroot, however, did not have claims of negligence
against Standley. As a breach of contract case, there would be no need to 'apportion fault' among
the parties.

Respondent's Brief, pp. 22.
R. Vol. II, pp. 290-328.
46 Respondent's Brief, p. 25.
44

45
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The order granting summary judgment to Standley despite the evidence presented is
contrary to Idaho Code as well as established Idaho case law to exclude testimony and evidence
regarding DeGroot's incidental and consequential damages. As such, this Court should reverse
the decision of the trial court.

B.
The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Rescission
In arguing that summary judgment was proper, Standley asserts that Beltman did not
timely notify Standley of its claim of rescission. 47 However, issues of fact have been presented
by DeGroot that make a determination of this issue on summary judgment inappropriate.
First, Standley was notified in June 2001 that DeGroot was unhappy with the manure
handling system Standley provided and installed. It was only three months later that DeGroot
filed suit against Standley for the defective manure handling system, which included a claim for
rescission. By focusing on Beltman's actions, Standley conveniently overlooks these facts.
Second, DeGroot immediately filed its complaint against Beltman following the Court's
order granting Standley'S first motion for summary judgment - certainly well within the six
month period established by Idaho Code § 28-2-725(3). Neither DeGroot nor Beltman had "slept
on its rights" or otherwise neglected to "make complaint" against Standley. At the very least, the
question of reasonableness is one for the jury. Therefore, the trial court's order granting Standley
summary judgment on this issue should be reversed.

47

Respondent's Brief, p. 29.
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C.
The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Indemnity
Standley next argues that "Beltman never stated a claim for indemnity against
Standley.,,48 As demonstrated below, however, a claim for indemnity was stated. Further, issues
of material fact exist that preclude summary judgment.
In the Beltman Complaint, the first two paragraphs set forth the theory and claim of
indemnity against Standley:
1. Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Beltman has been sued by plaintiffs Charles
DeGroot and DeGroot Dairy, LLC ("DeGroot") for breach of contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, rescission, breach of warranties,
and negligence-all arising from subcontract work perfumed by Standley and
equipment manufactured by Houle.
2. Standley and/or Houle are liable to Beltman for all of the plaintiffs' claims
against Beltman. 49
Idaho is a notice-pleading jurisdiction. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) provides
that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief shall contain "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "A complaint need only contain a concise
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief."so The Idaho
Supreme Court has stated that such pleadings should be construed liberally so as to "secure a
'just, speedy and inexpensive' resolution of the case."Sl The focus is on insuring "that a just

Id., p. 32.
S upp. R. p. 57.
50 Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,325,715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986).
51 Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.c., 138 Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2002) (quoting Christensen v.
Rice, 114 Idaho 929, 931, 763 P.2d 302,304 (Ct.App.1988)).
48

49
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result is accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms of pleading."s2 To
reach ajust result, "[o]ur Rules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading."s3 Thus,
the "key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is put on
notice of the claims brought against it. ,,54
Based upon Idaho's notice-pleading standard, it is clear that the Beltman Complaint sets
forth a cognizable claim for indemnity. The pleading is unequivocally sufficient to put Standley
on notice of the indemnity claim. Further, as described in the Appellants' Brief, DeGroot has
raised issues of material fact regarding the damages suffered.
Based on the foregoing, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
Standley on the claim of indemnity. Therefore, the decision granting summary judgment should
be reversed.

III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED ON STANDLEY'S
COUNTER-CLAIM
Standley asserts that the trial court correctly ruled that it was entitled to summary
judgment and prejudgment interest on its counterclaim. For the following reasons, the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on the counterclaim.
In support of their position, Standley asserts that it is "undisputed that DeGroot requested
the parts and services; agreed to pay for them; and then failed to pay as agreed.,,55 No citation is

Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606,611 (2008).
Youngbloodv. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 668,182 P.3d 1199,1202 (2008).
54 Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427, 95 P.3d 34, 45 (2004).
55 Respondent's Brief (Counterclaim), p. 6.
52
53
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provided for this assertion. 56 In fact, in response to Standley'S Motion for Summary Judgment,
DeGroot provided opposition to the Motion and asserted questions of fact with regard to
Standley'S counterclaim. 57 In addition, DeGroot asserted affirmative defenses such as breach of
warranties, negligent installation of the manure system, statute of frauds, breach of the covenant
of good faith, and offset. 58
As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, DeGroot has asserted genuine issues of material fact
with respect to the counterclaim brought by Standley. The factual issues surrounding the claims
of offset, warranty, failure of consideration, breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith illustrate that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of Standley on the counterclaim. For these reasons, the decision of the trial court on this issue
should be reversed.
IV.
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Because DeGroot believes that it will prevail on the issues argued above, DeGroot is
entitled to its attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120(3) and LA.R. 41. If it is found that
DeGroot is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Standley and Beltman, a clear
contractual and commercial transaction has been identified, thereby giving rise to DeGroot's
claim for attorney's fees. Standley, as the non-prevailing party, is not entitled to attorney's fees
associated with the appeal.

Id.
Id., pp. 180-201; R. Vol. II, pp. 202-349.
58 R. Vol. I, pp. 53-57; March 1,2005 hearing, p. 44.
56

57

APPELLANTS ' REPLY BRIEF - 14

V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, DeGroot respectfully requests this court reverse the decisions of
the trial court, as argued above, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for trial.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013.
DINIUS LAW

By:_---,f-r _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Kevin

Attorneys for Appellants
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